NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SR.1

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

4 December 2000
English
Original: Spanish

Main Committee II

Summary record of the 1st meeting
Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 26 April 2000, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:	Mr. Kobieracki	(Poland)
later	Mr. Suh Dae-won	(Republic of Korea)
later	Mr. Kobieracki	(Poland)

Contents

Programme of Work

General Debate

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent *within one week of the date of this document* to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza.

Any corrections to the record of this meeting and of other meetings willbe issued in a corrigendum.

00-40535 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

Programme of work

1. **The Chairman** said that, following the practice of previous conferences, Main Committee II had been assigned agenda item 16, "Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference". More specifically, the Committee would deal with agenda item 16 (c), which concerned the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones, in accordance with: (i) article III and the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, especially in their relationship to article IV and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs; (ii) articles I and II and the first, second and third preambular paragraphs in their relationship to articles III and IV; and (iii) article VII. The Committee would also examine other provisions of the Treaty relating to agenda item 16 (e). In addition, it would consider agenda item 17, "Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality".

2. As reflected in document NPT/CONF.2000/DEC.1, the Conference had decided to establish, for the duration, an open-ended, subsidiary body under Main Committee II, which would examine the "regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution" under the chairmanship of Ambassador Christopher Westdal of Canada. Its meetings would be held in private and the outcome of its work would be reflected in the report of Main Committee II.

3. With regard to the organization of work, he suggested that statements should be succinct and should address one specific issue at a time. Given the shortage of time, it was important that the discussions should lead, at as early a stage as possible, to specific conclusions or recommendations to be elaborated by the Committee in the form of its report, which would then be submitted by the end of the second week of the Conference. After recalling that at the 1995 Conference Main Committee II had been able to reach consensus on much of the text included in the report that it had sent to the Drafting Committee, he was optimistic that consensus could be achieved again.

4. **Mr. Westdal** (Canada), Chairman of Subsidiary Body 2, said that, given the shortage of time, work would focus specifically on the two regions where the situation was particularly complex: the Middle East and South Asia. The approach would be to evaluate the experience of the past five years, to consider the prospects of implementing the resolution on the Middle East, concerning which the Secretariat had provided useful information in document NPT/CONF.2000/7, and to analyse the situation in South Asia. He hoped that Main Committee II would thus be provided with documents containing agreements that could form part of the results of the Conference and which the Committee would incorporate in its final report.

5. The work would be carried out according to the following timetable: the first meeting would be devoted to the Middle East and the second to South Asia and related questions. At the end of the second meeting a draft text on the Middle East, drafted on the basis of informal consultations and of the discussion during the first meeting, would be submitted. The third meeting would be devoted to the Middle East, and specifically to considering the text which would have been distributed at the end of the second meeting. At the end of the third meeting, a draft text on South Asia, again drafted on the basis of informal consultations and the discussion at the second meeting, would be submitted. The last meeting would deal with both regions and it was hoped to prepare a text on the regional issues for transmission to the Conference.

6. **Mr. Nobuyasu-Abe** (Japan) supported the decision to concentrate on examining the Middle East and South Asia, although he believed that other regions also merited consideration as nuclear-weapon-free zones.

7. **The Chairman** took it that the Committee wished to adopt the draft programme of work.

8. *It was so decided.*

General debate

9. **Ms. Drábová** (Czech Republic) recalled that her delegation's position was reflected in the statement by the European Union. The increase in the number of States parties to the Treaty, currently 187, reflected

broad agreement that the further spread of nuclear weapons would endanger the security of all States. The Czech Republic, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, supported the universality of the Treaty and urged those States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty to do so.

10. As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had indicated in document NPT/CONF.2000/9, safeguards were the main component of the non-proliferation regime and represented an institutionalized way of ensuring transparency in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Believing that concluding safeguards agreements was one of the basic obligations of States parties to the Treaty, the Czech Republic had concluded its own agreement, which had come into force on 11 September 1997. The 55 States which were not fulfilling their safeguards obligations should enter into comprehensive agreements in that regard and should implement them.

11. Common experience acquired during the 1990s demonstrated the need to strengthen the system of international safeguards by providing the Agency with the means to detect undeclared nuclear activities. In that regard, the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements had contributed to greater transparency in nuclear activities. Her delegation was pleased to hear that 47 States had already entered into additional protocols, and that the latter were already in force for nine of them. The Czech Republic had signed its additional protocol on 28 September 1999 and, like many other countries, was working on the preparation of internal legislation to enable its early ratification. The additional protocol could be considered as a logical extension of the obligation contained in article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty. All States and other parties to safeguards agreements should bring into force additional protocols to their respective agreements; as the Agency had argued, that entry into force would strengthen the safeguards process.

12. Her Government had supported from the very beginning the simplified procedure for the designation of IAEA inspectors, and it did not require visas for the inspectors. As part of its collaboration with the Agency, her Government provided information on closed or decommissioned facilities, and exhaustive descriptions of the nuclear fuel cycle and of installations with large hot cells, most of which had already been inspected. It was also constantly exchanging information on its State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material.

13. Her Government was also helping to promote the application of other components of the non-proliferation regime. For example, in 1999 it had hosted for the fourth time the international training course on physical protection of nuclear material and installations, organized in cooperation with the Agency and the United States of America, which was part of the Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material. Countries in whose territory nuclear material was stored, handled or transported should implement strict provisions regarding accounting for and control of nuclear material, and the physical protection of such material at the level of the international standards. The Czech Republic had taken part in a review of recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material held under the auspices of the Agency, and was one of the eight countries which had welcomed at their nuclear installations missions from the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS).

14. Each exporting State which was a party to the Treaty had a responsibility to control its nuclear-related exports. As a member of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Czech Republic regarded transparent national export controls as an integral part of a strong non-proliferation regime. One of the main principles of that regime was acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards, which were required as a precondition of any supply of nuclear items. In connection with the adoption of a new Atomic Energy Act in 1997, the Czech Republic had amended its legislation in compliance with requirements in that area. Her Government supported the implementation at the national level of the NSG and Zangger Committee principles. It was also supporting the holding of seminars on control regimes such as those held in Vienna and New York, which it had helped to organize. It followed that all nuclear material and equipment or material designed for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material in the territory of the Czech Republic or under its control was used solely for peaceful purposes.

15. **Mr. Albuquerque** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, the Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,

Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, and the associated countries Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as Iceland and Liechtenstein, countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members of the European Economic Area emphasized the importance of the provisions of the decision on principles and objectives of the Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties regarding safeguards. All States which had not yet concluded safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should do so as soon as possible, in accordance with article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty.

16. The European Union was committed to strengthening the safeguards system, pursuant to paragraph 11 of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives, and strongly supported the May 1997 decision of the IAEA Board of Governors to adopt a Model Additional Protocol to existing safeguards agreements. Implementation of the measures contained in that Additional Protocol would lead to substantial strengthening of the effectiveness of the safeguards system and increase IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

17. The European Union and its member States had made an early start to negotiations with IAEA on three additional protocols to the safeguards agreements: one with the 13 non-nuclear-weapon States in the European Union, one for the United Kingdom and one for France. On 8 June 1998, the Council of the European Union had authorized the Commission to conclude the three additional protocols between the States members of the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and IAEA. Those agreements had been signed on 22 September 1998. A number of European Union member States had already ratified those agreements, and the others were well advanced in the process of doing so.

18. He welcomed the fact that the five nuclear-weapon States as well as 49 other States had concluded additional protocols, and 9 protocols were in force. The additional protocols were an integral part of IAEA safeguards agreements. Adherence to them was mandatory and they were therefore relevant to fulfilment of the obligations contained in article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty. All States should conclude and ratify the additional protocols without delay, with a view to the earliest possible implementation of a strengthened safeguards system.

19. The European Union welcomed the statement made by the Director General of IAEA concerning the need to complete the technical framework for the implementation of integrated safeguards by the end of 2001. The IAEA secretariat, in consultation with member States, was continuing to examine how existing safeguards and new measures could best be integrated. Those new measures should not be applied in a mechanistic way as a mere addition to the existing system. The European Union also welcomed the secretariat's commitment to increased efficiency without increased costs, and agreed that States which had implemented the additional protocol should benefit over time from a reduction in the volume of activities carried out by the Agency.

20. One issue of particular concern was that, since the previous Review Conference, no progress had been achieved in the implementation of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The European Union urged that country to comply with its safeguards commitments and cooperate fully with the Director General. In the preparatory committees for the Conference, as well as in meetings of the General Conference and the Board of Governors of IAEA, the European Union had expressed its deep concern that IAEA had not been able to carry out its mandate in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea because of a lack of cooperation on the part of its Government.

21. In the case of Iraq, the European Union was concerned that IAEA had been unable to carry out the tasks assigned to it in Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 1284 (1999). Although IAEA had been able to conduct a physical inventory to verify nuclear materials subjected to safeguards in January 2000, that could not be a substitute for its activities under the relevant Security Council resolutions. In that context, the European Union welcomed the appointment of the former Director General of IAEA, Dr. Hans Blix, to head the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).

22. The European Union reaffirmed the importance of the safe and effective management of fissile material designated by the nuclear-weapon States as no longer required for defence purposes, and called on those States to place such material under the appropriate international safeguards and physical protection, as agreed at the Moscow G-7/P-8 Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security. In that context, the European Union welcomed the further elaboration of the trilateral

initiative of the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA as a step towards the objective of paragraph 13 of decision 2 of the 1995 Conference, and called on them to continue those efforts. The European Union also welcomed the examination by the G-8 of measures to be adopted for the safe and effective management of excess fissile material in the Russian Federation.

23. It further welcomed the agreement reached in December 1997 among a group of nine countries, including the five nuclear-weapon States and two States members of the European Union, on a set of guidelines for the management of plutonium in all peaceful nuclear activities. Since confirmation of that agreement, the countries had published annual reports on their national stocks of plutonium.

24. Export controls were a responsibility and an obligation for each State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and all States must take measures to ensure that exports of sensitive materials, equipment and technologies were subject to an appropriate system of surveillance and control, facilitating cooperative technological development by reassuring suppliers that goods, technology and materials would be used only for peaceful purposes.

25. The European Union noted the work of the Zangger Committee and urged States parties to base their export control policies on the Committee's interpretations of their obligations under article III, paragraph 2 (see document INFCIRC/209 as amended).

26. The European Union commended the work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and felt it would be appropriate for the Conference to recognize its work. All States parties to the Treaty should follow the Group's guidelines when considering the export of dangerous nuclear material, equipment and technologies.

27. Effective physical protection of nuclear material, especially that which might be used for military purposes, was essential, and international cooperation in that field was needed. States which had not already done so should accede to the Vienna Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, adopt relevant physical protection measures and introduce and enforce appropriate measures to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.

28. The European Union reiterated the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as zones free from all weapons of mass destruction, and welcomed progress made thus far, in particular towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The members of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the nuclear-weapon States must continue their efforts to enable the nuclear-weapon States to sign and ratify the Protocol to the Treaty. The European Union looked forward to the early entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty and strongly supported signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols of the nuclear-weapon-free zones.

29. The European Union, its member States and associated countries would play a full, cooperative and constructive role in the Conference, with a view to furthering the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation, in accordance with the decisions taken at the 1995 Conference of the Parties.

30. **Mr. De La Fortelle** (France), supplementing the statement by the European Union, recalled that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which had entered into force 30 years previously, had achieved noteworthy results. With 187 States parties, the Treaty was recognized by virtually all the international community as an important legal instrument, and it was that universality which gave it authority. The 1995 Review Conference had confirmed and reinforced that authority by deciding to extend the Treaty for an indefinite period.

31. The 1995 Conference had confirmed that IAEA was the competent authority in the matter of safeguards, and the body which States should address on issues relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The safeguards system was vitally important, and it was crucial that it should be credible and reliable. Although the IAEA safeguards agreements were becoming effective and universal, 54 of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had not yet signed a full-scope safeguards agreement, as provided in article III of the Treaty. France regarded the universality of safeguards as being equally important as that of the Treaty itself, and urged all States which had not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with IAEA.

32. In the past, the verification system of the Treaty had encountered some difficulties owing to gaps in the system itself. In fact, IAEA did not have any legal means of monitoring the installations where non-

declared material might be, still less of carrying out inspections of clandestine installations. The discovery, almost 10 years before, of Iraq's clandestine military programme had put the system to the test. The inspections carried out by IAEA under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) had shown that for 10 years that State, a party to the Treaty and a signatory to a safeguards agreement, had been carrying out activities which had brought it virtually to a position to build a nuclear weapon, in spite of the inspections carried out in accordance with the safeguards agreement. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had also called the safeguards system into question by objecting to a verification of the accuracy of its initial declaration. Those facts, which could have endangered the effectiveness of the Treaty, had instead prompted the international community to strengthen it, by agreeing upon a Model Additional Protocol, approved by the Board of Governors in May 1997, which gave the Agency considerable powers of investigation.

33. Since the acceptance of the Model Protocol almost two years previously, only 49 countries had signed it, and nine had ratified it. France urged all States which had not yet done so to conclude an additional protocol as soon as possible, and was glad that the five nuclear-weapon States, having taken part in the drafting of the Model Additional Protocol, had together decided to enter into an agreement with IAEA.

34. France, whose civil nuclear installations came under the supervision of EURATOM, had undertaken to adopt all the measures in the Protocol which could increase the efficacy of the safeguards and contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in States which did not possess them. That undertaking had taken shape with the signing of the Additional Protocol between France, EURATOM and IAEA. The United Kingdom had signed a similar protocol. Having signed, France had started the internal procedure required in order to ratify the strengthened safeguards agreement as soon as possible.

35. France was glad to note the efforts made by IAEA to optimize its management. Given that the means at its disposal ought to match the responsibilities entrusted to it, France would support a reasonable increase in the Agency's resources. The rule on zero budget increases in real terms meant that almost 20 per cent of the budget of the Department of Safeguards had to be financed from extrabudgetary funds. That form of financing, when used to excess, created an unhealthy situation and made it difficult to plan programmes.

36. France supported the work being done by IAEA to prepare an integrated safeguards system, in line with the resolution adopted at the forty-second session of the General Conference. That system should eliminate redundancies and overlapping, thus making it possible to increase the efficacy of the safeguards while reducing costs.

37. The accession of the vast majority of States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons showed that it was one of the main issues of concern to the international community, and rendered even more unacceptable the continuing obstruction by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the Agency's efforts to monitor the implementation of the relevant safeguards agreement. France urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with its undertakings concerning the verification of nuclear installations and free access to them.

38. Iraq was also a cause for concern. Through its verification activities in Iraq since 1991, the Agency had been able to establish in 1997 a technically convincing outline of that country's clandestine nuclear programme. Although some uncertainty remained, because the Agency had been unable to fulfil its mandate for over a year, that did not prevent a plan being carried out for continuous monitoring. The process which should permit the resumption of monitoring activities in Iraq was now taking place: a new Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission had been set up. France reiterated its support for Mr. Hans Blix and for the new Commission in carrying out its functions as defined in Security Council resolution 1284 (1999).

39. It was essential to re-establish security and stability in the Middle East region, and for that purpose it was necessary to prevent Iraq from re-arming and to bring about the return of on-site inspectors. When the Commission was ready to take up its duties, everything possible must be done to obtain the cooperation of Iraq, which was indispensable in implementing Security Council resolution 1284 (1999). France noted that in January 2000, IAEA had verified the physical inventory of the nuclear materials which had been declared in accordance with the safeguards agreement signed by Iraq in 1972.

40. The security of nuclear material and installations was a fundamental objective of the struggle against proliferation and illicit traffic in nuclear and radioactive materials, and was necessary in order to establish confidence with regard to the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Effective, objective and transparent export controls were also needed, with mutual respect between the States providing the technology and those which needed it for their development, in order to assure the international community that no diversion of the materials would take place for illicit purposes.

41. France also attached importance to the control of stocks of fissile material which was no longer needed for defensive purposes, but it took the view that those activities should be financed only from the regular budget, not by increasing the number of special funds.

42. France welcomed the agreement by the IAEA Board of Governors concerning the danger of proliferation of the neptunium and americium generated by the irradiation of uranium in nuclear reactors, and was glad to note that putting it into practice would not have any impact on the implementation of IAEA safeguards, and would not adversely affect other activities of the Agency.

43. France unreservedly supported the struggle of IAEA and the international community against proliferation, and urged other States to do everything possible to eliminate nuclear weapons and trafficking in nuclear material.

44. **Ms. Hallum** (New Zealand) said that comprehensive and internationally-accepted safeguards agreements buttressed international security and provided a vital form of underpinning for international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. It was therefore of concern that there were still more than 50 States parties to the Treaty which had not yet brought safeguards agreements into force.

45. New Zealand had been one of the earliest States to sign and bring into force the Model Additional Protocol to existing safeguards agreements, with a view to strengthening the effectiveness and efficacy of the regime, and it regretted the fact that so few States had concluded additional protocols. Sadly, the goal of universal adherence to the Additional Protocol by the year 2000 had been missed.

46. New Zealand took the view that all States parties should establish a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, in accordance with paragraph 12 of the Principles and Objectives adopted by the Conference of the States Parties in 1995. Consideration should be given to the acceptance of the Additional Protocol as a condition for the supply of nuclear material, as soon as the adherence of a larger number of States was achieved.

47. New Zealand welcomed the decisions adopted in accordance with paragraph 13 of the Principles and Objectives to ensure the safe and effective management of material which was no longer required for defence purposes, and especially the trilateral initiative of the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA. It hoped that other nuclear-weapon States would enter into similar arrangements. Also to be welcomed was the agreement reached in 1997 on a set of guidelines for the management of plutonium. New Zealand took the view that similar guidelines were needed for the management of highly enriched uranium.

48. Reference must be made, once again, to the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, where the Director General of IAEA was still unable to verify the correctness and completeness of that country's initial declaration of nuclear material. New Zealand urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with IAEA without further delay. That agreement remained binding and in force, and must be implemented fully.

49. New Zealand also noted with concern that since December 1998 the Agency had not been in a position to implement in relation to Iraq the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council.

50. Controls on nuclear exports were complementary to safeguards. New Zealand was pleased to have been associated with two international seminars held in 1997 and 1999 on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation, and would continue to support any measure which would promote transparency in that area.

51. New Zealand strongly supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned, and emphasized the importance of nuclear-weapon States respecting and supporting the relevant protocols. It was therefore

gratifying that the United Kingdom and France had ratified the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga. She hoped that the United States would do the same as soon as possible.

52. While applauding the progress made in relation to nuclear-weapon-free zones in South-East Asia, Africa and Central Asia, she noted a regrettable lack of progress in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia.

53. New Zealand was supporting and co-sponsoring the initiative led by Brazil in the General Assembly for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, and would like to examine the possibility of enhanced political cooperation between States in the zone, as a first step in that direction.

54. **Mr. Minty** (South Africa) said that the Principles and Objectives endorsed in 1995 acknowledged the strategic association between IAEA, as the depositary of the safeguards system, and the international community. That association was due to the fact that efforts to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote disarmament could not be the responsibility of one organization or one State alone. South Africa attached great importance to the work of Main Committee II, which had to evaluate the results of that association and define goals for the future.

55. In 1995 South Africa had expressed its concern about some shortcomings in the existing non-proliferation regime, and had joined with those who were calling for a review of the safeguards system. IAEA must be congratulated on introducing a Model Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreements, in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the system.

56. South Africa welcomed the announcement by the Director General of IAEA that the secretariat of the Agency had already begun to implement some of the new measures, and that the process would continue throughout the year. IAEA would have to establish a new integrated system of safeguards, combining more quantitative aspects of the classic safeguards with the new measures, which were more of a qualitative kind.

57. South Africa had concluded negotiations with IAEA on the text of an additional protocol, and had begun preparations in its Parliament with a view to endorsing the agreement.

58. When the Agency had presented its plan for a strengthened safeguards system, it had believed that extra funds would be required for its execution in the short term, but that the expenditure would be balanced out in the longer term. It was now obvious that the new measures would not bring about any reduction in costs. In addition, new tasks had been entrusted to IAEA. South Africa therefore urged States parties to be realistic in that regard, and to bear in mind the content of paragraphs 9 and 19 of the Principles and Objectives. South Africa took the view that in order for the Agency to be able to extend its activities to other installations and countries, and to carry out the new tasks, it must be guaranteed the necessary resources, and that could not be done with a zero growth budget. It must be pointed out that neither could the problem be solved by resorting to an increase in extrabudgetary funds, which, as well as being unpredictable in the longer term, were subject to the interests of the donors and compromised the impartiality of the Agency.

59. Although there had been some setbacks in certain areas, he noted the positive developments which had occurred in relation to safeguards, especially the progress achieved through the trilateral initiative between IAEA, the Russian Federation and the United States.

60. Another important aspect relating to safeguards and verification was the physical protection of nuclear material. In that respect, mention must be made of the IAEA initiative to establish a database on illicit trafficking, which would be a useful instrument in that area.

61. South Africa had prepared a working paper for Main Committee II setting out some points for its future work, and would be grateful if it could be issued as an official document.

62. **Mr. Lipar** (Slovakia) said that nuclear energy played an irreplaceable role in the economy of the Slovak Republic. About 50 per cent of electricity production was from nuclear power. The country was developing its nuclear energy sector, and had six reactors in operation, one currently being decommissioned, one interim facility for spent fuel storage and one facility for the treatment of radioactive waste. Another storage facility for radioactive waste was currently being commissioned. All the spent fuel from the decommissioned reactor had been transported back to the Russian Federation, under an agreement

dating from 1956. The spent fuel from the nuclear power plants in operation was stored on site. There were also about 70 authorized users of small quantities of nuclear material, mainly in the form of protection containers made of depleted uranium. All the nuclear facilities and all nuclear material in the territory were subject to IAEA safeguards. In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic carried out inspections on the basis of the national law on nuclear energy, which had been in force since 1 July 1998. The law regulated the classification of nuclear material and the conditions for its production, processing, procurement, storage, transportation, use, accounting and control. Nuclear material could only be procured and used on the basis of a permit issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, which was empowered to impose fines of up to 1.2 million euros if nuclear material was procured without a licence or used for non-peaceful purposes.

63. Owners of nuclear material were obliged to keep exact records of the amounts, imports, exports, storage sites, consumption and transport of the material. All the relevant information was supplied to IAEA. Inspectors appointed by IAEA to visit Slovakia were accepted without objection, and could perform their duties without hindrance. Nuclear installations in Slovakia comprised five material balance areas, including the facility now being decommissioned. In 1999, nuclear material had been completely removed from that plant, but IAEA surveillance continued. So far, no unaccounted for material had been detected, owing in part to the requirements of the national accounting and control system administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority and to effective cooperation between all parties involved.

64. In the framework of the strengthened safeguards system, during the forty-third General Conference of IAEA, in 1999, a new agreement had been signed between the Slovak Republic and IAEA for the application of safeguards. The main feature of the agreement was that it reflected the new geopolitical situation following the constitution of the Slovak Republic.

65. Control of exports and imports of dual-use material, equipment and technologies served to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Law No. 547/1990 specified the basic principles of licensing and defined the obligations of exporters and importers, as well as the responsibility and powers of the licensing authority, the Ministry of Economy. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority was responsible for granting permission for the export and import of nuclear material, and equipment and technologies relating to the use of nuclear energy. In considering applications, the Authority followed the recommendations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the guidelines of the Zangger Committee, and its final decisions were binding on the Ministry of Economy.

66. Slovakia participated actively in the work of the Group, with a view to increasing transparency in the control of exports and imports. As agreed in the Zangger Committee, Slovakia reported annually on exports of source material, fissionable material, and material and equipment relating to nuclear activities.

67. Slovakia had also sought to contribute to the strengthened implementation of the safeguards system by withdrawing its reservations relating to sections 26 and 34 of articles VII and X of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of IAEA. The Slovak Republic regarded itself as bound by those provisions.

68. Slovakia, which had contributed actively to the creation of the IAEA Programme for Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System, fully supported every measure aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear materials on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, and preventing any violation of those provisions. Those measures should be supported by an effective system of physical protection for the purpose of preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. An extensive analysis should be carried out to assess the effectiveness of the assistance programmes implemented by IAEA and the member States for preventing illicit trafficking and protecting nuclear material. In that connection, the database on illicit trafficking was a useful instrument in evaluating the scale of the problem and devising effective remedial measures.

69. Slovakia took a positive view of the manner in which article III of the Treaty was being implemented, believing it was vital to continue promoting its implementation and improving current procedures, in order to reduce the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

70. *Mr. Suh Dae-won (Republic of Korea) took the Chair.*

71. **Mr. Tyson** (Australia) said that the IAEA safeguards system provided the means for States to demonstrate their commitment to using nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes and to have confidence in the peaceful nature of other States' nuclear activities. Those guarantees were a fundamental part of national, regional and global security. The peaceful nature of nuclear activities was the essential foundation for trade and cooperation in nuclear energy and for progress in nuclear disarmament. For those reasons, all Parties to the Treaty had an interest in strongly supporting the IAEA safeguards system and ensuring its continued effectiveness.

72. Iraq's clandestine nuclear-weapons programme, which was a determined challenge to the safeguards system, also revealed the need to strengthen the system in the area of detecting undeclared nuclear activities or material. The action taken to that end was one of the most important achievements since the 1995 Conference of the Parties. Australia strongly supported the strengthening of the safeguards system and had been the first State party to the Treaty to ratify the Model Additional Protocol. It was disappointed, however, that, three years after its adoption, only 48 protocols had been signed and 9 ratified.

73. The States parties to the Treaty must promote the early global application of the Model Additional Protocol, which served the interests of all States by increasing the ability of IAEA to provide assurance as to the peaceful nature of nuclear activities, which, in turn, enhanced global security, cooperation and progress on nuclear disarmament. It was therefore important that it should be signed by all States, including those which had declared that they did not carry out significant nuclear activities. Australia urged all States which had not yet done so to ensure that they had an additional protocol in force as quickly as possible, and it urged those which had not even signed a safeguards agreement to do so without delay.

74. In 30 years, compliance with the Treaty's safeguards obligations had been excellent. There had been only two significant violations of those obligations: by Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In both cases, the international community had responded promptly with support for the norms of the Treaty. In 1992, some inconsistencies had been detected, suggesting that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea might have separated plutonium without declaring it to IAEA. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had yet to extend to IAEA the cooperation necessary for verification of its initial inventory. Australia strongly supported the Agreed Framework which provided a mechanism for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to come into full compliance with its safeguards obligations under the Treaty and benefit fully from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His delegation noted with appreciation the good work done by IAEA in verifying the freeze of nuclear activities required by the Agreed Framework. Australia, for its part, had contributed $15.8 million thus far to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization.

75. It was of great concern that, since December 1998, IAEA had been unable to conduct its verification and monitoring activities in Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolutions. Iraq must cooperate fully with IAEA and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in order to achieve full implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions and comply with its obligations under the Treaty. His delegation noted that, in January, IAEA had conducted an inspection under the safeguards agreement.

76. The cases of Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea highlighted the importance of access to the Security Council by the IAEA Director General and the vital role of the Security Council with respect to violations notified by IAEA.

77. The Conference should examine the area of nuclear supply, including reinforcement of barriers to nuclear proliferation, without impeding the legitimate right of non-nuclear States to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference should again highlight the importance of Parties to the Treaty ensuring that their nuclear-related exports did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It should also recognize that export controls were essential to offering the long-term security and stability that underpinned peaceful nuclear cooperation.

78. Both the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee had acted with determination to promote greater transparency in export controls and the preparation of reports for the Conference of the Parties. Australia was an active member of both bodies, reflecting its strong support for the participation of suppliers in international cooperation activities for the

peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation. Australia had long been a proponent of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply of nuclear material to non-nuclear-weapon States and hoped that the Conference would reaffirm the States parties' commitment under the Treaty to the full-scope safeguards supply condition. The Conference would also need to consider how supply arrangements would take into account measures to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system. His delegation believed that, in the near future, the INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement, coupled with an additional protocol, should be implemented in order to ensure the full-scope safeguards required by article III of the Treaty and comply with the Principles and Objectives of the 1995 Conference of the Parties.

79. His delegation welcomed the progress made in response to the call in the 1995 Principles and Objectives for fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful activities to be placed under IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable. It also welcomed the trilateral initiative by the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA to develop a new verification system for former weapons material.

80. Pending negotiation of the fissile material cut-off treaty, his delegation hoped that China would join the moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons announced by the other nuclear-weapon States and that India, Pakistan and Israel would place a moratorium on the production of fissile material and participate constructively in the negotiations on the cut-off treaty.

81. His delegation urged all States which had not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material at the earliest possible date. It also wished to see the extension of international physical protection standards to domestic activities and, to that end, welcomed the current discussion of the possibility of reviewing the Convention. The Conference would also need to consider reports of illicit trafficking in nuclear material and should urge all States to implement measures and promulgate legislation designed to provide assurance as to the security of such material.

82. The Conference should note the important progress made on nuclear-weapon-free zones: since 1995, with the signature of the Protocols to the Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba by nuclear-weapon States, the number of non-nuclear-weapon States benefiting from negative security assurances from the five nuclear-weapon States had increased from 33 to 99. The real prospect of establishing a central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and the discussions aimed at securing the signatures of the nuclear-weapon States on the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok should also be mentioned.

83. Australia encouraged the members of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the nuclear-weapon States to continue their discussions aimed at resolving remaining differences and enabling the nuclear-weapon States to sign a Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok. His delegation reiterated its preparedness to offer practical assistance to the sponsors of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone initiative, drawing on its experience with the South-Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

84. Australia and a number of other non-nuclear-weapon States had prepared a series of drafts on Main Committee II issues. In addition, Australia and Japan had put forward a proposal on measures to be taken for the implementation of the Treaty, including some relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones and safeguards, which were relevant to the Committee's deliberations as well.

85. **Mr. Casterton** (Canada) said that since the beginning of the preparatory process, Canada had emphasized that the mandate of the Conference should be not merely to examine the state of implementation of the various articles of the Treaty, but also to look to the future and define the areas in which progress could be made, as well as the means for achieving that objective. That was an essential element of "permanence with accountability", a principle which all recognized was fundamental to the 1995 extension decision.

86. Undoubtedly the IAEA safeguards, administered in conformity with article III of the Treaty, should continue to be the fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as an essential element of the implementation of the Treaty. The safeguards regime ensured that all States complied with their undertakings. Consequently, the States parties should continue to promote universal application of the safeguards to all peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in all States parties, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. In spite of the significance attached to that

objective at the 1995 Conference, there were still 54 States parties which had not signed a safeguards agreement in line with the undertaking assumed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That situation ought to be remedied as soon as possible, to demonstrate universal adherence to that provision of the Treaty and unanimous support for its objectives. On the other hand, however firmly Canada advocated universal adherence to the Treaty, it was also important, as an interim measure in line with paragraph 11 of decision 2 of the 1995 Conference, that all States which were not parties to the Treaty should be urged to enter into general safeguards agreements with IAEA, although that in itself would not be sufficient.

87. All States parties should comply fully with the provisions of their respective agreements. In that light, Canada remained gravely concerned at the fact that IAEA could not verify the accuracy of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In those circumstances, IAEA could not offer any guarantees about the fate of the material. Canada was also concerned that since December 1998 IAEA had been unable to fulfil its mandate in Iraq, as required by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Consequently, the Agency could not offer any assurances that Iraq was complying with its obligations under those resolutions. Both questions should be resolved as a matter of urgency. Canada urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iraq to cooperate fully with IAEA.

88. In the past five years, notable progress had been achieved in the adoption of measures to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards regime, but the system was now at a crossroads. One path led on through classical comprehensive safeguards. It offered the prospect of adding the new measures to the old approach, perhaps with a few minor adjustments. The other path was clearly more challenging, offering an opportunity to conceptualize, develop and apply new safeguards approaches for a State as a whole, based on the integration of old and new measures. The aim of the new approaches was to reaffirm guarantees of the absence of undeclared nuclear material, and of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material. With the new approaches, a State which signed the additional protocol would provide the Agency with enhanced information about its nuclear activities, and greater access to the places where those activities were carried on.

89. Canada believed that the Conference should encourage all States parties to conduct negotiations as soon as possible for an additional protocol, and to apply it as quickly as national law permitted. In that connection, the additional protocol signed by Canada had yet to be ratified, pending promulgation of the new nuclear safety and control act, which was expected by the end of May 2000.

90. In the view of Canada, if the Conference did not inspire the Agency and its member States to conclude promptly the work on safeguards, which had to be carried out with the resources available, that would certainly have a negative impact on achieving the primary objective, which was to encourage States to sign, ratify and apply the protocol. As a long-term goal, States parties should consider the possibility of establishing a general agreement on safeguards together with an additional protocol, in accordance with paragraph 12 of decision 2 of the 1995 Conference.

91. As for controls on exports of material relating to nuclear activities, they were a key element of an effective non-proliferation regime, in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Those measures also facilitated international cooperation in nuclear activities for the benefit of economic and technological development, in line with the provisions of article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. States must establish effective controls in order to comply fully with the obligation to report on exports and imports of the articles specified in annexes I and II to the Model Additional Protocol. In Canada's opinion, the Conference should recognize the important function of export controls, and should continue to argue for transparency of such controls in the framework of dialogue and cooperation among interested States parties.

92. The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities was an integral part of the effective promotion of nuclear non-proliferation. For Canada, it was essential for all States to apply the IAEA recommendations concerning the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, as set out in document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4. Canada urged States parties to ratify the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and took the view that the Conference should consider ways and means of promoting those objectives.

93. Lastly, Canada reaffirmed its strong support for establishing internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. The Conference should actively promote the creation of other nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia.

94. *Mr. Kobieracki (Poland) resumed the Chair.*

95. **Mr. Cordeiro** (Brazil) pointed to the significance of the adoption by the Disarmament Commission, in 1999, of a document containing guidelines on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and setting out concepts and principles which had been the subject of many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly over the past decade.

96. Since the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, in 1978, it had been recognized that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, based on arrangements freely arrived at among States of a particular region, constituted an important disarmament measure which enhanced regional and global peace and security, strengthened the non-proliferation regime and contributed to the attainment of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. Since 1996 Brazil and other States parties to existing agreements had been sponsoring a resolution in the General Assembly which noted that the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas were an emerging nuclear-weapon-free zone, and urging all States to contribute in consolidating that situation.

97. The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties should take account of the developments which had taken place since 1995: the consolidation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the conclusion of the Treaties of Bangkok and Pelindaba, the many ratifications of additional protocols whereby nuclear-weapon States gave negative security assurances, the steps taken by Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and the intention of States in existing zones to increase cooperation among the various nuclear-weapon-free zones and to feature that in the final published document.

98. It was a matter of priority to ensure that nuclear-weapon States which had not done so ratified as soon as possible the additional protocols to the respective treaties, and that all States considered the proposals to that effect, including those reflected in resolutions of the General Assembly on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia, issues which his country would also like to see reflected in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference.

99. Lastly, he emphasized that Brazil's support for the establishment of zones of peace was not in fact limited to nuclear-weapon-free zones. In partnership with 21 African and South American countries, Brazil had promoted the concept of a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic. In Ushuaia in 1998, the member countries and associated countries of MERCOSUR had declared MERCOSUR, Chile and Bolivia a zone of peace free from weapons of mass destruction. His delegation pledged its full support in finding common approaches to the important issue of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

100. **Mr. Rich** (United States of America) said that the international non-proliferation regime could be likened to an architectural structure deriving stability from its constitutive elements, which were mutually reinforcing. Safeguards protected and warned against any attempt to divert nuclear material for illicit use; sound conditions of supply helped to ensure that nuclear commerce did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and nuclear-weapon-free zones reinforced the Treaty regime at the global level.

101. In the past five years the safeguards system had seen noteworthy developments. In June 1995 measures had been adopted to strengthen it, under powers which the Agency had possessed in the model full-scope safeguards agreement (IAEA document INFCIRC/153); in May 1998 the member States had agreed to strengthen safeguards still further by establishing new measures under the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements. Since then they had worked diligently with IAEA to integrate those measures with the ones contemplated in document INFCIRC/153.

102. The common goal should be to optimize the combination of measures provided for both in the comprehensive safeguards agreements and in the additional protocols. The "optimum combination" should be technically sound, cover all possible paths to procurement and retain the positive aspects of the traditional measures (such as nuclear material accountancy), while augmenting their value by

introducing new measures. If the transition to that "optimum combination" was properly carried out, the safeguards system would be strengthened by giving it an added objective, rather than modifying one it already had. The new system should provide assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear activity, while continuing to guarantee that nuclear material used for declared activities could not be diverted for other purposes. By acquiring broader scope, the safeguards would strengthen the non-proliferation regime and thereby international security. The United States hoped that the new measures would be widely adopted and implemented. The strengthened system of safeguards should become the new international standard. To date 40 States, including the five nuclear-weapon Powers, had signed protocols, nine of which had already entered into force. However, many States had not even entered into the comprehensive safeguards agreements required by article III of the Treaty. The United States urged them to do so, and at the same time to sign and implement additional protocols.

103. In the context of safeguards, mention must be made of the two States which were in breach of their safeguards agreements and of related resolutions of the Security Council. The United States urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate with IAEA by coming into full compliance with its safeguards agreement, and urged Iraq to respect in full its obligations under the Treaty, as directed by the Security Council.

104. The United States was convinced that strengthening the non-proliferation regime required IAEA to have adequate resources available to do its work, and was firmly committed to that. Of course, it took the view that resources should be managed with maximum efficiency and effectiveness, and commended the Agency on its efforts in that regard.

105. Although the safeguards system was available to prevent proliferation, extra care was required when dealing with weapon-usable material. It was a positive fact that in 1997, recognizing the importance of curbing the unnecessary accumulation of separated plutonium, nine countries had adopted international guidelines designed to promote transparency and strategic planning in civil applications of plutonium, which presupposed acceptance of the principle of balancing supply and demand.

106. The United States was also committed to reducing to a minimum the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for civilian purposes. It was encouraging to know that, thanks to current research, HEU in research reactors could in future be substituted by new nuclear fuels containing low-enriched uranium (LEU). A number of countries, including Australia, Canada, China, France, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, had made the commendable decision to design new research reactors using LEU as fuel. As part of the programme for Reduced Enrichment in Research and Test Reactors, supported by the United States, a number of countries were seeking to develop a process using LEU instead of HEU to produce molybdenum-99, for use in nuclear medicine. To help States substitute LEU for HEU, the Department of Energy of the United States had decided in 1996 to accept return shipments of fuel (either spent or fresh, both HEU and LEU) from reactors where a pledge had been made to shut down or convert before May 2006. The United States hoped that the Committee would recognize the importance of reducing civilian applications of HEU to a minimum.

107. As for the management of nuclear material which was usable for the manufacture of weapons, it was necessary not only to ensure that its production and use were reduced to a minimum, but also that secure methods were available for disposing finally of material released from military programmes. The United States and the Russian Federation were working together to convert excess fissile material in such a way that it would either be used for civilian purposes or remain unavailable for military applications. Both countries and IAEA were seeking to create a legal mechanism and an efficient system whereby the Agency could verify the completion of measures to render irreversible the reduction of nuclear arsenals.

108. To prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear material, it was essential to strengthen the international system of physical protection, which could not be done without increased international cooperation. Thanks to IAEA's International Physical Protection Advisory Service, member States had been able to assess and strengthen the security of their own systems. Reflecting the concern excited by the question, there had been a growth in demand for training courses and an increase in technical cooperation projects to promote the security of nuclear material and facilities. The United States hoped that the Convention on the Physical

Protection of Nuclear Material would be strengthened and that the same standards would apply to the use, storage and transport of nuclear material at the national level as in the international sphere.

109. With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, the United States continued to support treaties which were consistent with its well-known criteria. It had already signed the Protocols to the Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba, and was working intensively with the countries in the region to find a formula which would enable it to sign the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok. It had consulted closely with the countries which were negotiating for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

110. While trade was being promoted in nuclear technologies and materials to be used for peaceful purposes, controls must be introduced on exports in order to ensure that such trade did not lead to proliferation. Article III, paragraph 2, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty provided that nuclear material and equipment could only be supplied subject to the comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Zangger Committee had been established in order to develop a common criterion for implementing that requirement, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group ensured that nuclear trade was conducted in a manner consistent with the principle of non-proliferation, thus fostering confidence that international security would not be subjected to commercial interests.

111. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had endorsed full-scope safeguards as a condition for the supply of new nuclear material. That condition reinforced the principle of preferential cooperation among parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States urged all States to take that principle into account in new supply arrangements and, in the case of existing agreements, to adapt them to it as soon as possible.

112. The parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had also recognized the importance of controlling dual-use exports. Dual-use technologies were becoming increasingly widespread, so the application of such controls was especially important, as shown in the case of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.

113. In 1995 the Review Conference had also adopted the principle of transparency in the control of nuclear-related exports, within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested parties to the Treaty. To fulfil that objective, the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group had organized seminars in 1997 and 1999, in Vienna and New York respectively, on the role of export controls in strengthening nuclear non-proliferation. Representatives of members and non-members of the Group had spoken at the seminars, which all States had been invited to attend. The members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group had prepared a collective document for the seminars explaining the origins, development, purposes and effects of nuclear-related export controls, published by IAEA under the symbol INFCIRC/539.

114. The United States believed that the Treaty regime was being consolidated and that much progress had been achieved over the past five years. The IAEA safeguards system had been strengthened, cooperation in the management and control of nuclear material usable for military purposes had improved, and so too had cooperation for the physical protection of such material. Controls of nuclear-related exports were much more transparent, and nuclear-weapon-free zones were playing a more important role in regional security.

115. **Mr. Abe** (Japan) welcomed the fact that since the 1995 Review Conference, nine new countries had joined the Treaty. States parties should urge those States which had not ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible. States parties should also ensure the irreversibility of non-proliferation by shoring up and strengthening the Treaty regime.

116. Nuclear testing by India and Pakistan had constituted the most serious challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime over the previous five years; the international community should have continuous dialogue with both countries by sending a clear message that nuclear proliferation in South Asia was a matter of global concern and by calling for steps to be taken by both countries to respect the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Japan considered it particularly important that both countries should sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as their leaders had promised at the United Nations General Assembly.

117. Japan believed that although the Middle East was a region in which only one country was still outside the Treaty, there was some evident risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It was therefore regrettable that no significant step had been taken on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, as

stipulated in the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Serious work should be done during the coming five years to implement the resolution. In that connection, Japan was encouraged by the fact that the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), which had been established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), was being set up.

118. Turning to North-East Asia, he said Japan believed that the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea provided a most realistic and effective approach to keep the Democratic People's Republic harnessed to the non-proliferation regime, which it had threatened to abandon. Japan had therefore been contributing to the light water reactor (LWR) project through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

119. In that context, he recalled that under the terms of the Agreed Framework, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and was committed to allowing implementation of its safeguards agreement. The international community had repeatedly expressed the view, at meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations, that the safeguards agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and IAEA was still in force despite the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from IAEA, and that the State was obliged to fulfil its obligations under that agreement. The LWR project had recently entered the stage of full-scale construction and, at that critical juncture, Japan wished to reiterate that full compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its safeguards agreement with IAEA was a major premise for the construction of LWRs in the Democratic People's Republic. Furthermore, Japan encouraged the Democratic People's Republic to faithfully fulfil all the obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, in particular, to collaborate with IAEA without delay in order to achieve full compliance with the safeguards agreement.

120. The IAEA safeguards system was essential for the maintenance of the non-proliferation regime established under the Treaty. Japan wished to underscore the importance of the Model Additional Protocol and recalled that it was one of the first countries whose additional protocols with IAEA had entered into force. He reiterated that there should be some form of international action plan to rapidly conclude the protocols, and urged IAEA and member States to take concrete steps to that end. In considering such an action plan, countries might wish to convene an international conference. Japan was ready to work with IAEA and other member States in that regard.

121. With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, Japan welcomed the fact that agreements had been concluded for two regions, namely Africa and South-East Asia, and hoped that the Pelindaba Treaty would come into force at an early date and that agreement would be reached on the protocol of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone between the States in the region and the nuclear-weapon States. Japan vigorously supported the five Central Asian countries which were currently engaged in negotiations on a treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and had offered to host a meeting at which those negotiations could be pursued.

122. His Government was convinced that there should be strict control of export licences for goods and technology which could be used for the production of nuclear weapons, and that they should be issued only when the recipient countries adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or an equivalent treaty, and had in force a safeguards agreement with IAEA. Japan urged other countries to take similarly strict steps.

123. Japan supported the mechanisms of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group as multilateral resources in that field, and appreciated recent efforts by the Group to increase transparency in its activities, in response to the decision taken by the 1995 Review Conference.

124. **Mr. Gorita** (Romania) expressed his support for the statement made by the Director General of IAEA, and recognized the importance of the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, cooperation regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment for the transfer of nuclear technologies, and assistance to States that fully applied the safeguards agreements.

125. As a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Romania had adapted its legal and institutional framework in the field of non-proliferation and control of nuclear-related activities, and had signed all relevant agreements and conventions in those areas. On 11 June 1999, Romania had signed the additional protocol to

the safeguards agreement, which allowed IAEA to establish better control over all nuclear activities.

126. At the national level, the adoption of the European convention regarding environment protection through criminal law was under consideration. With regard to the control of nuclear exports, Romania believed that the established mechanisms were important factors for nuclear non-proliferation. As a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, it fully met its obligations and commitments under that arrangement. Although it was not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, since 1993 Romania had adopted the control list and guidelines issued by the Regime. The Government had adopted Emergency Ordinance No. 158/1999, concerning the control of strategic exports, and would also adopt the consolidated list comprising the technologies and products which were subject to export control. The Romanian Non-Proliferation Group had been set up in June 1998 to prevent illicit trafficking in materials which could be used in the production of weapons.

127. Romania appealed to all countries to sign the safeguards agreements and to accede to the Model Additional Protocol to the agreements, in order to allow the necessary surveillance for the diffusion of nuclear scientific knowledge for the benefit of all humanity.

128. **Mr. Suh** Dae-won (Republic of Korea) said that the safeguards system introduced in response to article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been very effective, particularly in verifying States' declared nuclear material and facilities. However, the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme had awakened the international community to the need to strengthen the existing safeguards system. The Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements should provide IAEA with a powerful tool for verifying States' compliance with their non-proliferation commitments. Nonetheless, it was important to secure universality of the protocol for effective assurance of non-proliferation. The Republic of Korea had signed an additional protocol in June 1999 and was taking measures for its early implementation.

129. The background paper prepared by the IAEA secretariat (NPT/CONF.2000/9) reported that the Agency remained unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on its nuclear material subject to safeguards and, accordingly, could provide no assurance about non-diversion. It further reported that, despite 13 rounds of technical consultations between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since 1994, no progress had been made on certain key issues, in particular the preservation of the information needed to enable the Agency to verify the initial declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its nuclear material and facilities subject to safeguards. As called for by General Assembly and IAEA resolutions, his delegation urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with its safeguards obligations.

130. His delegation was pleased to note that more than 100 States had signed treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, covering more than 50 per cent of the Earth's surface. It also welcomed the guidelines and principles on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, adopted by consensus in the Disarmament Commission.

131. Moreover, an effective non-proliferation regime should be accompanied by measures to warrant nuclear material security and export control. The IAEA efforts to detect and curb illicit trafficking in nuclear material were praiseworthy. It was to be hoped that the ongoing discussion on ways and means of strengthening the regime of physical protection of nuclear material would have a satisfactory outcome.

132. With regard to nuclear export control, his delegation took note of the vital contribution of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Particularly noteworthy were the international seminars on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation, which had strengthened the regime by broadening the understanding of its legitimacy.

133. Lastly, his delegation wished to emphasize that it had faithfully fulfilled its obligations under the nuclear export control regime since joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in October 1995.

134. **Mr. Hasan** (Iraq) reiterated that his country was prepared to offer its cooperation with a view to achieving the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As the objective of the Conference was to review the implementation of the Treaty since the convening of the 1995 Conference of the Parties, distorted and incomplete versions of previous events

should not be brought up for political purposes, so as not to impede the attainment of the proposed worthy goals.

135. Iraq fully complied with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards system, as the IAEA inspectors had been able to confirm on their visit to Iraq in January 2000. IAEA had indicated that Iraq had cooperated fully with its inspection team and that all nuclear materials had been verified and the results were consistent with the reports submitted. Therefore, anyone who requested Iraq to abide by the safeguards system did not know the facts or was attempting to overlook them. Rather than rehashing erroneous information, the question to be asked was how a depositary State of the Treaty, like the United States of America, could open up its nuclear laboratories to experts from a State which was not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, namely, Israel, in accordance with an agreement signed in 2000 between the two States while preparations for the Conference of the Parties were under way.

136. As for the relationship between Iraq and the Security Council, that was a purely political question which had no connection whatsoever with Iraq's obligations under the Treaty and safeguards system. Those who insisted on that point should contemplate all the aspects of that relationship. In the first place, IAEA activities had been utilized for purposes of spying on Iraq; indeed, the information obtained in the inspections had been communicated to Washington. The inspectors themselves had admitted that espionage activities for the United States and Israeli intelligence services had been carried out, a fact which even the United States had not denied.

137. The use of IAEA and the United Nations for espionage activities had undermined the prestige of both organizations. Iraq urged IAEA to investigate that scandal and to inform the States parties to the Treaty of its findings. It was to be hoped that the Committee would formulate recommendations in that regard.

138. In the second place, IAEA had withdrawn its inspection and verification teams from Iraq in accordance with instructions from the Executive-Chairman of the Special Commission, Mr. Richard Butler, in violation of his obligations and responsibilities, without eliciting any reaction from the Security Council. That meant that activities in Iraq had been suspended since 16 December 1998. That fact had to be pointed out in order to examine the situation with complete objectivity.

139. The depositary States of the Treaty, namely, the United States and Great Britain, had organized air attacks against facilities subject to the IAEA safeguards system only hours after the departure of the IAEA inspectors. The attacks had caused the destruction of equipment left behind by the inspectors, including sensors and cameras. The illegal use of force, without any authorization from the Security Council, had destroyed the IAEA control system in various Iraqi towns. It was to be hoped that the Committee would condemn those acts of aggression and that Iraq would be compensated for the damage suffered.

140. The United States and Great Britain had utilized depleted uranium ammunition in their attacks against Iraq, in violation of their obligations under the Treaty. That ammunition had again been utilized against Yugoslavia in 1999. Radioactive weapons had also been used, causing the death of thousands of Iraqi civilians, particularly children, and various types of cancer, including leukaemia. The issue was whether the Commission would recommend the non-use of such ammunition in war and compensation for Iraq and would send an IAEA mission to eliminate uranium residue from such ammunition.

141. It should be recalled that the main blow to the safeguards system had been the 1981 Israeli attack against Iraqi nuclear facilities that were intended for peaceful uses. In its resolution 487 (1981), the Security Council had called upon Israel to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. That resolution had not been complied with thus far. It was to be hoped that the Committee would be fair to Iraq and recommend the prohibition of all types of attacks against nuclear facilities subject to the safeguards system and compensation to Iraq for the damage caused by those acts.

142. In paragraph 14 of its resolution 687 (1991), the Security Council had indicated that the actions to be taken by Iraq should be aimed at establishing a zone free from nuclear weapons and all types of weapons of mass destruction. Thus far, that paragraph had not been implemented. It was to be hoped that the Committee would recommend that Israel should accede to the Treaty and subject its facilities to safeguards with a view to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

143. He hoped that the deliberations of the Conference and Committee would include an analysis of the setbacks in order to overcome them and face the future in a spirit of collective action which promoted confidence in the Treaty and the safeguards system, and their universal application.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.